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Abstract
Many online content providers aim to compensate for a loss in advertising revenues by charg-
ing consumers for access to content. However, such a choice is not straightforward because
subscription fees typically deter customers and a resulting decline in viewership further reduces
advertising revenues. This research examines whether firms that offer both free and paid content
can benefit from adjusting the amount of content offered for free. We find that firms should offer
more free - and not paid - content in periods of high demand. We motivate theoretically that
this policy which we term ‘counter-cyclical offering’ may be optimal for firms when consumers
are heterogeneous in their valuation of online content, this heterogeneity varies over time, and
more so for low consumer types than for high types. Using unique data from an online content
provider, we then provide empirical evidence that firms indeed engage in counter-cyclical offering
and increase the share of free content in periods of high demand.
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1 Introduction
Over the last decade, a decline in print advertising and a slow uptake of online advertising revenues
have put many news media into a perilous state. The Newspaper Association of America suggests
more than a 50% decline in total newspaper advertising revenue from 2007 to 2012. 1 In December
2008, The Tribune, owner of the Chicago Tribune and LA Times, filed for bankruptcy protection.
In 2009, the New York Times credit crisis prompted a piece questioning its continued existence
(Hirschorn, 2009). Many regional newspapers, such as the Miami Herald and the San Francisco
Chronicle face similar financial trouble.2 Then, in August 2013, The Washington Post was sold,
because “for much of the past decade, The Post has been unable to escape the financial turmoil
that has engulfed newspapers” (Farhi, 2013).
The prevalent view has long been that on the Internet “information wants to be free” and that
consumers are unwilling to pay for content online (Edgecliffe-Johnson, 2009), but the future of the
news industry is now widely believed to depend on the ability of companies to monetize content
online. Yet, charging for online content is difficult: Paywalls decrease viewership and as a result
further depress advertising revenues (Chiou and Tucker, 2013). This trade-off between subscription
and advertising revenues means that charging for all content rarely benefits firms and has lead many
to try and combine both revenue streams. The New York Times, for example, offers 10 free articles
per month and the Washington Post in 2013 introduced a limit of 20 free articles per month.
Such policies allow to price discriminate between consumers who have heterogeneous valuations.
High demand consumers will subscribe and so generate advertising and subscription revenues. Low
demand consumers will not subscribe but still view free articles and generate advertising revenues.3
This pricing policy works if consumer valuations stay constant over time or the ratio of valuations
of low and high demand consumers remains similar, even as their absolute levels change.
Yet, there is evidence that demand for news varies substantially. Panel A in Figure 1 displays
the normalized number of searches in the US for ‘Politics’, ‘Earnings’, ‘Sports’, ‘Temperature’,
‘Movies’ and ‘MLB’, as reported by Google Trends. It documents that the demand for news is
1http://www.stateofthemedia.org/2013/newspapers-stabilizing-but-still-threatened/
1-print-advertising-fall-online-grows-copy-5/; accessed April 29, 2015.
2http://www.realclearpolitics.com/lists/top_10_newspapers_in_trouble/newspapers_in_trouble.html;
accessed April 29, 2015.
3‘’Leaky paywalls’ that are aimed at allowing low value consumers access to articles through search engines or
social networking services serve a similar purpose.
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highly cyclical. In business the cycles are quarterly related to earnings reports, while in politics
the main cycles are four-yearly, coinciding with the US Presidential elections, with additional, less
pronounced intermediate cycles. For sports, there appears to be an annual cyclical pattern that
becomes pronounced when focusing on any specific sport, here Major League Baseball (MLB).
Demand for sport news appears to be higher at times when a sport is ‘in season’ and games are
played. To show that this is indeed the case, we plot the number of unique daily visitors to the
MLB webpage of four leading sports websites in Panel B of Figure 1 (data described in detail in
Section 3). We find that consistent with the data collected via Google Trends, unique visitors to
any of the websites more than double when the sport is ‘in season’.
[Figure 1 about here.]
How firms can best respond to such variation in demand is not obvious. Increasing prices
during periods of high demand, as classic economic theory suggests, is challenging since consumers
typically sign up for long-term (mostly yearly) contracts. It is also not obvious whether demand
shocks indeed affect valuations of high type consumers in the same way that they affect valuations
of low type consumers. Take as an example a baseball buff who is eager on baseball news at any
time and the occasional fan who only gets excited as the sport is in season. It would not surprise
that the demand by the occasional fan shifts more strongly as a season starts than that of the
baseball buff. Similarly, a member of a political party may read up on politics every day while the
average citizen strongly increases their valuation for news on politics on election day. And indeed,
in the rare occasion when online content providers respond to changes in demand they appear to
offer more - not less - free content during periods of high demand. For example, the New York
Times and the Wall Street Journal both lifted their paywalls during the 2012 election. Yet, apart
from these few examples we know very little about how online content providers should adjust the
provision of free versus paid content over time and whether increasing (decreasing) the supply of
free - and not paid - content during periods of high (low) demand is indeed a viable strategy.
In this paper, we provide a theoretical motivation for an online content provider’s choice of
revenue model, accounting for both advertising revenues and subscription revenues from yearly
contracts. We show that it can be optimal for a firm to charge for content during periods of low
demand but offer content free of charge during periods of high demand, a strategy that we term
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‘counter-cyclical offering’. The key characteristics of demand are that consumers have heterogeneous
valuations, where valuations vary across time and across consumers. Our result is driven by the
assumption that valuations of low type consumers increase more strongly in periods of high demand
than valuations of high types consumers. We then turn to data to provide empirical evidence that
firms use counter-cyclical offering. We use unique data from the online sports website ESPN that
offers the majority of content for free but charges a fee for access to a subset of articles. Importantly,
the number of free and paid articles varies by day and sport. Over a 13-month period, we collect
data on the number of free and paid articles per day and sport. We complement these data with
data on unique visitors and page views (the number of instances a user viewed the firm’s web pages)
for each article type per day and sport. We demonstrate that the firm indeed counter-cyclically
adjusts its offering, and relate our results back to the theoretical motivation.
Our results add to three streams of academic research. First, we add to research that models
analytically when firms benefit from charging for online content. Shapiro and Varian (1998) and
Bhargava and Choudhary (2001) show that offering a paid and a free component can allow firms to
implement quality differentiation, versioning, or second-degree price discrimination. But since paid
content reduces the number of page impressions and thus advertising revenues, it can lead to a dis-
advantage in advertising markets if advertisers pay a premium to firms with a high expected share
of loyal consumers (Athey et al., 2013). The level of competition (Godes et al., 2009) and consumer
heterogeneity further affects the trade-off between free and paid content. With heterogeneous con-
sumers, firms should combine pay-per-view and advertising revenues but offer options to consumers
(Prasad et al., 2003). Additionally, Halbheer et al. (2014) show that advertising effectiveness de-
termines whether a firm should offer both paid and free content and find that under intermediate
levels of advertising effectiveness firms should offer both. While these studies provide insights into
when charging for online content may be beneficial, they do not account for variation in valuations
over time and do not cover how online content providers should respond to such variation.
A second stream of research looks empirically at an online content provider’s choice of revenue
model. For an online content provider targeted toward marketing professionals, Pauwels and Weiss
(2008) find that moving from ‘free’ to ‘fee’ can be profitable. But Chiou and Tucker (2013) show
that visits to online news sites fell by as much as 73% following the introduction of a paywall,
suggesting that it is challenging to charge for news content online. Other research underlines that
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consumers respond negatively to even small fees (Shampanier et al., 2007; Ascarza et al., 2012). And
while recent research has documented the conditions under which online advertising can be effective
(Goldfarb and Tucker, 2011a,b; Lambrecht and Tucker, 2013; Lewis and Reiley, 2014; Goldfarb and
Tucker, 2015), many news sites are unable to rely on this revenue stream alone. More broadly, our
research relates to work on complementarity and substitution of online and oﬄine content (Seamans
and Zhu, 2013) and a literature that explores how providers of digital content can monetize their
offering, including how a firm that offers a print and a pdf version should set prices (Kannan et al.,
2009; Koukova et al., 2012), the firm’s trade-off between selling or renting content (Rao, 2015), and
the profit- and welfare-maximizing price format (Shiller and Waldfogel, 2011). To our knowledge, no
papers have addressed the question of how firms can set prices and the trade-off between advertising
and subscription revenues when consumers’ valuations vary over time.
Third, we add to the literature on counter-cyclical pricing that has emerged in the area of
consumer goods and builds on prior research on why firms sell products below cost (Lal and Matutes,
1994). Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) suggest that an oligopolist may benefit from decreasing prices
from an optimal collusive outcome when demand is high. MacDonald (2000) shows that seasonal
price declines in periods of high demand are closely linked to market concentration. Warner and
Barsky (1995) and Chevalier et al. (2003) point out that for a large number of consumer packaged
goods, prices decrease during periods of high demand. Chevalier et al. (2003) demonstrate that
consumers are not more price sensitive during these periods but instead retailers use products as
loss leaders that are seasonally in high demand. Nevo and Hatzitaskos (2006) propose that the
substitution to less expensive brands explains a decline in the average prices paid during periods
of high demand. As an alternative explanation, Haviv (2015) relates firms’ counter-cyclical pricing
to consumers searching more in periods of high demand. Most closely related to our work is
the explanation by Guler et al. (2014) that counter-cyclical pricing is profitable if consumers are
heterogeneous in their valuations and demand shocks affect low consumer types more strongly than
high types. Along similar lines, Bayot and Caminade (2014) document the entrance of a price-
sensitive segment during periods of high demand. We add to this literature by demonstrating how
firms that offer contracts, and so cannot readily adjust prices, can yet respond to changes in demand
by counter-cyclically adjusting the amount of content they offer.
Our results have implications for online content providers that as of yet largely offer a fixed
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number of articles per month as free. While such policies might have other advantages (e.g. pre-
dictability for a consumer), the inflexibility to respond to demand shocks can be a drawback. Our
research suggests that for online content providers it may, counter-intuitively, be optimal to in-
crease the share of paid content during periods of low demand but offer more free content when
demand increases. While many demand shocks are predictable, it is important to note that for
counter-cyclical offering to work, the firm does not need to be able to predict demand in the long
run. Digital technology means that online content providers can flexibly assign any new piece of
content to be free or paid as they observe changes in demand.
2 Motivation for empirical analysis
We provide a theory-based motivation to show that counter-cyclical pricing can be optimal in an
online news market. The setup differs from the set up for studying counter-cyclical pricing in a
retail context as prices are in the form of yearly fees, unlike in a retail context where firms can
change prices over time. Additionally, the firm trades off subscription and advertising revenues.
In our model the firm decides whether to make articles free or paid in any season and the price
of annual contracts. Given the content offering of the firm, consumers decide whether or not to
purchase yearly contracts and whether or not to visit the website in any season.
We assume that in any season the firm offers either all articles for free or against a fee. Our
objective is to demonstrate that for some parameter values, the firm will charge for content only
at times of low demand. Following, we borrow the terminology of sports and refer to times of low
demand as ‘off season’ and times of high demand as ‘in season’.
2.1 Consumer decisions
We first define the consumer valuations. Assume there are two types of consumers, high types
(H) and low types (L). Let sL represent the share of consumers of type L. Assume there are two
pre-determined seasons which affect consumer demand, off season (O) and in season (I), each of
equal length N. The valuations vi,j for consumer type i and season j are shown in Panel A of Figure
2. Here α, αH , αL ∈ [0, 1]. α represents the ratio of the in-season valuation for low type consumers
relative to high type consumers. αH (αL) represents the ratio of off-season to in-season valuations
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for high (low) type consumers. We assume that the change in valuations across seasons is greater
for low types than for high types and so αH > αL. Define r ≡ αHαL and by assumption we have
r > 1.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Each consumer makes two decisions. First, they decide whether to subscribe to the paid service.
We assume that low consumer types will never purchase the service. This assumption is consistent
with low types having a reservation value of RL ≥ α(1+αL) for paying for the service.4 We assume
that high type consumers will purchase the service if W (vI,HPaidI +vO,HPaidO) ≥ pc where Paidj
is an indicator for the firm offering a paid (and not free) service in season j and pc is the price of
paid content. The firm offers only annual subscriptions. W is a constant that scales willingness to
pay.
Second, conditional on having access to the website, each consumer decides how often to visit
the website. Note that if the website is free, then all consumers have access to content. If the
website is paid then only consumers who have paid for the service will have access. We assume that
based on their valuations consumers determine how often to visit the website. The total number of
visits by consumer i in season j is Nvi,j . For each visit to the website the firm receives advertising
revenue. We define pA as the price for all page views a consumer makes during a visit. We assume
that the advertising price per page view is fixed and does not vary across seasons. We later verify
this assumption in our empirical setting.
2.2 Firm decisions
In our structure, the firm makes three decisions: First, the firm decides whether to provide free
content or paid content when a sport is off season. Second, it decides whether to provide free content
or paid content during a sport’s season. Third, it decides on the price for an annual subscription
to paid content. To define the firm’s optimal strategy, we consider all four combinatorial options
for charging for online content across seasons: The firm can always offer free content (Free), always
offer paid content (Paid All), offer paid content only off season (Paid Off ) or offer paid content
only during the season (Paid In). In each season, we consider the profit maximizing subscription
4Note that this assumption is not necessary for our model, but simplifies our calculations.
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price, that is the price pc that will extract maximum value from the high consumer type. For each
of these scenarios the high type consumers will always visit the website and generate an advertising
revenue of pAN(1 + αH)(1 − sL). The four scenarios differ in the subscription revenue that the
firm obtains from high type consumers and the advertising revenue from the low types. Panel B of
Figure 2 summarizes revenue from these two sources across the four scenarios.
Given the scenarios we state our main result and, in Proposition 1, show the existence of a set
of model parameters for which counter-cyclically adjusting the content offering can be optimal.
Proposition 1. Charging only when a sport is off season (Paid Off) yields the highest profit, or
piPaid Off > max(piFree, piPaid All, piPaid In), if the following equation holds:
1
1 + pANW α
< sL <
r
r + pANW α
Proof in Appendix Section A.
Panel C of Figure 2 graphically displays the intuition of this result. If the share of low type
consumers (sL) is sufficiently low, the optimal firm policy is to charge for all content as the benefit
from subscription is greater than the benefit from advertising. But if the share of low type consumers
(sL) is sufficiently high, the optimal firm policy is to make all content free as the benefit from
advertising is greater than the benefit from subscription. The key insight is that for intermediate
values of the share of low type consumers (sL) the firm should charge for content only when a
sport is off season. This setting balances the revenue from subscription and advertising by gaining
subscription revenue from attracting high value consumers off season while not alienating low type
consumers during the season. It relies on the fact that in season there is a large share of low type
consumers willing to visit - and thus the ability to generate advertising revenue at this time - but
still unwilling to pay for access to content. We term this policy ‘counter-cyclical offering’. Note
that the key demand conditions for this policy to hold is that consumers are heterogeneous in their
valuations, that valuations vary across time and that valuations of low type consumers vary to a
greater extent than valuations of high types.
Competition: Proposition 1 focuses on a monopolist but many online news markets are com-
petitive. We next consider a duopoly with two symmetric firms (F1 and F2). We assume there
are two segments of consumers (of equal size) with a preference for either F1 or F2, and a lower
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valuation for the competing firm. In Appendix Section B we show formally that our main result
holds for a duopoly. Moreover we show that even in the case of ex-ante symmetric firms, there
exists an equilibrium where one firm adjusts its offering counter-cyclically (WLOG say F1) and the
other firm provides all content for free (WLOG say F2). We discuss here the intuition of this result
by describing each firms best response.
First, consider the best response for firm F1. Since the competitor F2 always provides content
for free, F1 can never attract consumers with a preference for F2. Similar to Proposition 1, we find
that for some intermediate values of sL
5 it is optimal for F1 to provide a counter-cyclical offering.
Second, consider the best response for F2. F1 charges for content when a sport is off season, now
F2 can attract low type consumers with a preference for F1 by offering free content. This implies
that off season F2 can earn additional advertising revenue from these consumers. We find that
this additional advertising revenue lowers the threshold of the share of low type consumers (sL)
at which it is optimal for F2 to always provide content for free. Comparing the thresholds from
the first step and the second step, we find that for intermediate values of sL, F1 providing content
counter-cyclically and F2 providing free content is an equilibrium.
3 Empirical application and data description
3.1 Empirical setting
Empirically, our research is situated in the context of the sports website ESPN.com (henceforth
ESPN). ESPN provides a wide range of coverage on sports. ESPN has a main homepage plus
homepages for each sport that display article title and links but no abstracts or full articles.
Two characteristics make this an ideal setting for analyzing counter-cyclical offering of online
content. First, ESPN offers two types of articles: regular articles, available free of charge to all
consumers (hereafter free articles), and insider articles (hereafter paid articles), available only to
subscribers. On each sport’s homepage, paid articles are easily recognizable through a small orange
‘in’-icon. The number of paid articles varies across days and sports. Second, consumer demand for
sport news varies over time, for example based on whether a sport is off season or in season, or
5Exactly as in Proposition 1, we find that sL needs to be in an intermediate range, that is low enough that the
firm does not always provide content for free and high enough that the firm does not always charge for content.
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whether on a day a game is played.
We collect data on six different sports that offer both paid and free articles: college basketball
(CBA), college football (CFB), professional baseball (MLB), professional basketball (NBA), profes-
sional football (NFL), and professional hockey (NHL). We do not use data from sports for which
ESPN did not offer paid articles during our observation period (e.g., NASCAR, or tennis).
3.2 Website content and user activity
A typical challenge in analyzing the pricing of online content is the difficulty in obtaining data that
disclose detailed usage information alongside information on content offering and pricing strategies
as well as information on industry-wide demand. We circumvent this challenge by combining mul-
tiple data sets. Our data capture, over 13 months, per day and sport the number of free and paid
articles featured on the firm’s sport-specific homepage, the number of unique visitors to the paid
and free sections on the firm’s website, and page views in both sections. They also include, on
a day and sport level, unique visitors and page views to the main competitor. Our data is thus
disaggregated on the day and sport level. We next lay out our data in detail.
[Figure 3 about here.]
ESPN website content: We collect on a daily basis the number of free and paid articles on each
of the six sports home pages at ESPN from December 2010 to December 2011. For free articles, we
collect the links with the url-format espn.go.com/sportname. For paid articles, we collect the links
with the url-format insider.espn.go.com/sportname.6 On average a sport’s home page displays 34
articles per day, of which 30% are in the paid section (Figure 3, Panel A; Appendix B compares
free and paid articles in more detail.)
ESPN user activity: For the same time period, we obtain daily data from Comscore on con-
sumer activity by sport. These data include the number of unique visitors, the number of pages
viewed, and the total time spent for both free and paid articles. We do not have access to
6We then identify links that remain on a sports homepage for a long time period (more than 100 days). These links
typically do not represent content-based news articles but provide general information that often does not change over
time (e.g., links to pages on the NBA draft for previous years, or games timetables). We count as articles all links
that appear on the sports home page for less than 100 days. We note that we collect data on the number of links and
not the content within each link.
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consumer-level data. Consistent with our definition of free and paid articles, we use the url-formats
espn.go.com/sportname and insider.espn.go.com/sportname to identify website activities.
Comscore collects its data from a panel of consumers whose web activities they follow and weighs
the individual-level observations to obtain a data set that is representative of the US population.7
This approach means our data sometimes artificially record zero visitors (mostly to the paid sec-
tion) even though the true number for the US population is nonzero. We exclude these 218 out
of 2,250 day-sport observations but in unreported robustness checks find that all our results are
robust to including these observations. On average, we observe about 650,000 unique visitors to
a sport’s website on a day (Figure 3, Panel A). Anyone visiting a web page with the url-format
espn.go.com/sportname (insider.espn.go.com/sportname) on a day is counted as a visitor to the free
(paid) section for that sport on that day. This includes the sport’s homepage but excludes ESPNs
main homepage. Each visitor reads on average 5.2 articles for about a minute per article. The paid
section of each sport’s website attracts about 28,000 unique visitors per day. This represents 4% of
all visitors.
Competitor user activity: To control on a day and sport level for demand for sport news, we
obtain Comscore data on the number of unique visitors, page views, and time spent per day and
sport at the main competitor sports.yahoo.com that offers free content only. Page views and time
spent per visitor at Yahoo is comparable to those for free ESPN articles. We collect similar data
for the sports’ websites of two other competitors that also offer free content, Sports Illustrated
(CNNSI.com in 2011) and CBS Sports (cbssports.com).
Demand shifters: We identify factors that may shift consumer valuations over time. First, for
each sport, we identify the start and end of each season. In the off-season, no regular games are
scheduled though sports news are still available, such as about free-agency signing, drafts, and scores
for pre-season games, results of which are not considered in the teams final performance. During
the season, scheduled games and a sport’s final games (playoff in MLB, NBA, NFL, NHL; the bowl
season for college football and March madness in college basketball) are played.
Second, we collect data on sport events that may shift consumer valuation of sport news. This
includes whether or not a game was played in a sport on a day, the date of the final game within
each sport, for professional sports the dates of the draft, and for college sports college-signing day
7Our data is an extract from a larger proprietary database held by Comscore.
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and the dates of the NBA lockout in the 2011 season. We also record days of the week.
Third, as a measure of demand shocks in a particular sport specific to ESPN, we collect data
from Google Trends on the number of searches for ESPN + sport for every day in our data. We
scale the data to numbers between 0 and 10.
3.3 Subscription and advertising revenues
Customers can sign up for one of three membership plans to access paid articles. A two-year
membership costs $2.50 per month, a yearly membership plan $3.33 per month, and a monthly
membership $6.95 per month. We obtain data from Comscore on the number of customers that
sign up for each of the plans for December 2010 to December 2011. They suggest that 82% of
customers choose a yearly or a two-year plan (47% of customers choose the yearly plan, 35% choose
the two-year plan) and 13% choose the monthly plan, giving us an average subscription price of
$40.44 per year, or $3.37 per month.
ESPN features advertising on all webpages, including the home pages for each sport and the
page for each article. Each page typically displays one ad, independently of whether an article is
free or paid. From Comscore, we obtain additional data on monthly page views and advertising
revenues at ESPN during our observation period that allow us to compute the average advertising
revenue per page view. We find that, on average, ESPN earns $9.11 per 1000 page views. We
obtained informal confirmation from ESPN that this value broadly reflects their advertising prices.
To understand the variation of the advertising price across advertisers and time, we collected two
pieces of information: the average monthly advertising price per 1000 page views from December
2010 to December 2011 and the average advertising price per 1000 page views paid by each of 612
advertiser for the month of June 20118. We find the coefficient of variation across months is 0.06
and the coefficient of variation across 612 advertisers is 0.08. This suggests that consistent with our
theoretical motivation, advertising prices vary little. Further, we examined the advertising prices
ESPN communicates to advertisers on their website. We find that ad prices vary by sport but do
not vary by season or by whether an ad appears in the free or paid section (see Appendix Section
D for more details).
8We chose June as some sports are in season and some off season: MLB is in season for the full month; NBA and
NHL are in season until June 12 and June 15 respectively; the remaining three sports are off season. We plot the
distribution of the average advertising price per page views in Appendix Section D
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4 Empirical evidence for counter-cyclical offering
4.1 Sports’ seasons as demand shifters
To understand whether the firm is in a position that it can counter-cyclically adjust its content
offering, we explore the key shifters of demand for sport news at ESPN. The left column of Panel
B, Figure 3 illustrates that sports fixed effects explain about 40% of the variation in unique visitors
and page views per visitor to the free section and most of the variation in the time visitors spend
per page, suggesting that consumption of sport news is driven by the type of sports. Importantly,
a sport’s season - and so a variable that changes over time - likewise explains 42% of variation in
unique visitors and 32% of variation in page views per visitor, suggesting that season is a key driver
of demand. Other indicators of demand, including demand at the corresponding sports’ websites of
Yahoo, CNNSI and CBS, explain additional variation in user activity. The right column of Panel
B, Figure 3 explores demand for the paid section of ESPN. It demonstrates that sports fixed effects
explain almost all variation in unique visitors, page views per visitor, and time spent per page in
the paid section while season explains relatively little variation in any of these variables.
The last bar on both sides displays the variation in articles available on ESPN. It illustrates that
the total number of articles available (left column) and the share of paid articles (right column)
vary with sport and season, suggesting that a sport’s season is important in the supply of articles.
We further explore the role of sports’ seasons in the demand for and supply of paid content.
Panel A, Figure 4 provides descriptive statistics by season. Demand, as measured by unique visitors
to the free section of ESPN, any of the other sport website (Yahoo, CNNSI, CBS) or Google searches,
is unequivocally higher when the sport is in season. Interestingly, when the sport is not in season
the number of unique visitors drops by more than 500,000 (about 50%) and visitors to the site view
on average two pages less. Panel B, Figure 4 graphically illustrates the great drop in demand for
sport news when a sport is off season. The results are consistent with the fact that there is less
news to report in the off-season when no games are played and further confirm that sports’ seasons
strongly impact demand
Together, these data point to season as an important shifter of demand and further are consistent
with the assumptions taken in Section 2. First, consumer valuations are heterogeneous as evidenced
by the fact that some consumers subscribe to the paid section while others do not. Consumers who
13
This manuscript was accepted for publication in 'Management Science'. The version of record can be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2383
This manuscript was accepted for publication in 'Management Science'. The version of record can be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2383
visit only the free section are likely low type consumers whereas subscribers to the paid section are
high types. Second, valuations of low type consumers, i.e. those that visit only the free section,
vary over time and are particularly low when a sport is off season – unique visitors, page views per
visitor and time spent per page view increase significantly when a sport is in season. Third, the
fact that for the paid section unique visitors, page views per visitor and time spent per page view
exhibit significantly less variation suggests that valuations of high type consumers vary far less.
[Figure 4 about here.]
4.2 Evidence for counter-cyclical offering
We next examine the firm’s policy in offering paid content. Panel A, Figure 4 shows that the share
of paid articles follows the opposite trend than the demand for sport news. It increases from 25%
when the sport is in season to 35% off season. Panel B, Figure 4 again graphically illustrates that
when a sport is off season, i.e. when demand drops by more than 50%, the firm increases the
share of paid articles by 40%. Yet, the total number of visitors to the paid section does not change
depending on a sport’s season (statistically insignificant at a 95% confidence level). These results
suggests that indeed the firm may be engaging in counter-cyclical offering.
To provide non-parametric evidence for counter-cyclical offering, we plot in Figure 5 the distri-
bution of visitors to ESPN (left column) and the share of paid articles (right column) separately
for each of the six sports in our data. The black solid line represents days when the sport is in
season and the dashed gray line represents days when the sport is off season. We see that for all
sports the distribution of daily visitors is shifted to the right when the sport is in season and the
mean of unique daily visitors during a sport’s season is significantly higher than when a sport is off
season. We find the opposite when we consider the share of paid articles. Here, the mean of the
percentage of paid articles is lower during a sport’s season for any of the sports and the empirical
distribution of the percent of paid articles when the sport is in season is stochastically dominated
by the distribution when the sport is off season. This result further supports that the firm increases
the share of paid content at times of lower demand and so engages in counter-cyclical offering.
[Figure 5 about here.]
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We next show that these results hold when controlling for parameters other than a sport’s season
that might possibly shift demand and supply of paid content. In Column (1) in Panel A, Figure 6 the
dependent variable is the log of unique visitors to ESPN. Again, demand increases during a sport’s
season relative to when a sport is off season, on average by 36%. 9 Column (2) illustrates that this
pattern is not unique to ESPN but holds when the dependent variable is the log of unique visitors
to Yahoo’s sports websites where demand increases by on average 39%. Column (3) shows that this
effect does not exist when the dependent variable is the log of unique visitors to ESPN. Contrast
the results in Columns (1) and (2) with the results in Column (4) where the logit transformation of
percent of paid articles (log( percent of paid articles1−percent of paid articles)) is the dependent variable. Here, the percentage
of paid articles is significantly lower when a sport is in season.
Panel A, Figure 6 yields further insights with respect to the firm’s policy on counter-cyclical
offering: It illustrates that demand for news at ESPN is significantly higher on game days and at
times when demand at the respective sport’s website on Yahoo is high, a variable that we take as
indicator for other unobserved demand shocks. At both times, ESPN reduces the share of paid
content which suggest that the firm engages in counter-cyclical offering along a variety of demand
shifters. Together, these results provide strong evidence that the firm counter-cyclically adjusts the
share of paid content it offers.
[Figure 6 about here.]
4.3 Linking the empirical analysis with the theory
We link our empirical results to the assumptions and predictions of the simple model presented in
Section 2. Section 4.1 demonstrated that consumer valuations are heterogeneous and that valuations
vary over time and across consumer types. To further support the assumption that valuations of
high type consumers vary less than of low types, we examine in Column (1) of Panel B, Figure 6
the share of unique visitors that visit the paid section of ESPN. This serves as an empirical proxy
for the share of high type consumers. Consistent with the model assumption, we find that the share
of high type consumers is significantly lower when sports are in season.
9Note the interpretation of the regression coefficient as a percentage change assumes that the error term does vary
across seasons, formally we assume E(e|Off season) = E(e|In Season). We maintain this assumption throughout
this section.
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The simple model also assumed that conditional on visiting, the number of articles a unique
visitor reads does not vary by season. Column (2) takes as dependent variable the number of page
views per visitor. In line with the assumption, we find no evidence for a change in the number of
pages viewed across seasons. We note that page views significantly increase on game days, which is
not surprising as consumers can log on to check scores.
We turn to the implicit assumption of our model that if the firm counter-cyclically adjusts its
offering, we should observe less low type consumers visiting the website on days when the firm
provides paid content. Column (3) shows that even after controlling for season the the number of
unique visitors to ESPN is negatively correlated with the percent of paid content. We note that this
coefficient should be interpreted as a correlation and not as a causal link. Instead, consistent with
our theoretical motivation, our interpretation is that it can be optimal for ESPN to increase paid
content on days with a lower number of visitors to the site. Our model further suggests that the
change in the amount of paid content offered is driven by low type consumers visiting the website.
We test if the correlation is more pronounced during sports’ seasons when more low type consumers
are likely to visit. Column (4) interacts the percent of paid articles with season and indeed shows
a stronger relationship between total visitors and paid articles only when the sport is in season (we
note that the estimate is statistically significant at the 90% level).
In Appendix Section E, we calibrate our analytical model with the empirical means from the
data. We find that the calibrated model does suggest that counter-cyclical offering is optimal for
ESPN.
5 Conclusion
Pricing access to online content is a key challenge for news media, especially as advertising revenues
have dramatically declined in the recent past. The first difficulty is that many consumers are not
willing to pay for online content and so firms need to trade off advertising and subscription revenues.
Second, demand for online content varies greatly over time and across customers, making it difficult
to determine the profit-maximizing price. Third, online content providers sign long-term contracts
with consumers, preventing them from flexibly adjusting prices in response to changes in demand.
We propose that online content providers can respond to this challenge by counter-cyclically
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adjusting their offering of paid content. While there has been anecdotal evidence for this idea, we
provide a theoretical motivation and empirical support that firms indeed engage in counter-cyclical
offering and show that such a policy can be profit-maximizing. We first show in a simple model that
it can be optimal to offer paid content during periods of low demand and free content during periods
of high demand. We then use data from ESPN, an online sports’ website, to demonstrate that firms
indeed implement such counter-cyclical offering. We show that consumers are heterogeneous in
their valuations, that valuations vary over time, and that low consumer types are more sensitive to
demand shocks than high types - the three conditions required for making counter-cyclical offering
an attractive strategy. We then provide evidence that the firm counter-cyclically adjusts its share of
paid content. That is, in periods of high demand ESPN offers a lower share of paid content than in
periods of low demand. We conclude that counter-cyclical offering allows online content providers
that sign long-term contracts with their customers to flexibly respond to changes in demand.
Our results contribute to marketing research by showing how firms that offer contracts can apply
a policy broadly related to counter-cyclical pricing to respond to changes in demand without actually
varying prices. It also has important implications for the management of online content providers.
Our findings suggest that online content providers may be better off by flexibly adjusting how much
content they offer for free instead of setting a static paywall, as often is managerial practice. While it
appears that in exceptional instances firms have experimented with such an approach, we argue that
this may be optimal more broadly. We suggest that managers should more broadly identify demand
shocks and respond to an increase in demand by offering more free, relative to paid, content. While
we demonstrate our empirical results in the market for sport news, we believe that our results have
implications for many other types of news content and hold whenever there is demand heterogeneity
coupled with strong seasonality in demand. As we discussed in the introduction to this research,
anecdotal evidence suggests that both conditions hold in many types of news markets.
Of course, our work has limitations. Most importantly, we focus on one dimension along which
firms can optimize their revenue model, a dynamic versus a static policy. There are many other
important questions that we leave to future research to explore such as whether content providers
should bundle their online and oﬄine offering, what optimal price to set, and whether such prices
should vary with article type or quality. We also do not study the actual news content provided.
Additionally, while our empirical setting demonstrates that firms can indeed benefit from counter-
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cyclically adjusting the amount of free content, we cannot rule out that there may be instances
when consumers respond negatively to firms adjusting the provision of free content over time (e.g.
backlash by non-subscribers who can access little or no content during off season). Our analytical
model does not capture such a response. Lastly, our empirical study is set in an industry in which
many firms (still) offer all content for free. If all or most competitors charge for access to content,
a different kind of subscription model may be optimal. We leave such questions for future research.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. We prove this proposition in the following steps:
Step 1: Consider piPaid Off versus piPaid In
piPaid Off > piPaid In ⇐⇒ pANsLα(1− αL) > W (1− αH)(1− sL)
⇐⇒ sL
1− sL >
W (1− αH)
pANα(1− αL)
Step 2: Consider piPaid Off versus piPaid All
piPaid Off > piPaid All ⇐⇒ pANsLα > W (1− sL)
⇐⇒ sL
1− sL >
W
pANα
Step 3: Consider the two equations from Step 1 and Step 2
αL < αH ⇒ 1− αH
1− αL < 1⇒
W (1− αH)
pANα(1− αL) <
W
pANα
Therefore if piPaid Off > piPaid All, we must have piPaid Off > piPaid In. Overall steps 1 to 3 give us a
lower bound for sL that is
sL
1−sL >
W
pANα
.
Step 4: Consider piPaid Off versus piFree
piPaid Off > piFree ⇐⇒ W (αH)(1− sL) > pANααLsL)
⇐⇒ sL
1− sL <
WαH
pANααL
=
Wr
pANα
This gives us an upper bound for sL that is
sL
1−sL <
Wr
pANα
.
Step 5: Rearrange to get main result. From steps 3 and 4 we have
Wr
pANα
>
sL
1− sL >
W
pANα
⇐⇒ r
r + pANW α
> sL >
1
1 + pANW α
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By assumption we have r > 1 therefore the lower bound ( WpANα) must be less than the upper bound
( WrpANα). We can rearrange the terms in the equation and get
r
r + pANW α
> sL >
1
1 + pANW α
B Extension to Competitive Markets
In this subsection we consider a competitive market with two symmetric firms (F1 and F2). We
assume that there are two segments of consumers (of equal size) one with a preference for F1 and
one with a preference for F2. Consumers discount their valuation for the other firm by γ < 1.
Formally, valuations across segments, types and seasons are given in the table below. Here the first
value in parenthesis represents the value for F1 and the second value in parenthesis represents the
value for F2.
Prefer F1 Prefer F2
Consumer Type Consumer Type
Season H L H L
N (1, γ) (α, γα) (γ,1) (γα, α)
O (αH , γαH) (ααL, γααL) (γαH , αH) (γααL, ααL)
For simplicity of notation in this section define ∆ = W (1−γ)pANα .
Proposition 2. When both firms are symmetric, there exists an equilibrium where one firm will
charge for content when a sport is off season (Paid Off) and the other firm will always provide
content for free, when the following conditions hold
∆ (r) > sL1−sL > ∆
(
r
1 + γ
)
r > 1 + γ
Proof. We will prove this result in the following steps. In step 1, we will show that if Fk (k ∈ {1, 2})
decides to always provide content for free then Fl’s (l 6= k) best response will be to charge for
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content off season (counter-cyclical offering) if r∆ > sL1−sL > ∆. In step 2 we will show that if Fl de-
cides to charge for content off season (counter-cyclical offering) then Fk’s best response is to provide
content for free if sL1−sL > ∆
(
r
1+γ
)
. By the condition r > 1+γ, step 2 defines the lower bound for sL.
Step 1: Fl’s best response if Fk provides content for free
If Fk always provides content for free, Fl can never attract any consumers with a preference for Fk.
However if Fl charges for content then it can lose consumers to Fk. In particular, for high type
consumers who prefer Fl, the willingness to pay for Fl changes to: (1−γ)(1PaidI+αHPaidO) ≥ pcW .
To see this, suppose that Fl charges for content when a sport is off season (PaidO = 1) and not
when a sport is in season (PaidI = 0). Consider the subscription decision for Fl by high types
with a preference for Fl. If a consumer subscribes they get a utility of αH − pcW and if they do
not subscribe they get a utility of γαH from visiting Fk off season. Therefore the consumer will
subscribe if αH(1− γ) ≥ pcW .
Therefore this case mirrors the monopoly case with the parameter of willingness to pay trans-
formed to W (1− γ) and from Proposition 1 we get that the optimal response for Fl is to charge for
content when a sport is off season if
r∆ >
sL
1− sL > ∆
Step 2: Fk’s best response if Fl charges for content off season and provides content
for free during the season (counter-cyclical offering)
In this case, low type consumers with a preference for Fl will visit Fl only during the season.
These consumers may visit Fk during off season if Fk provides content for free. Therefore if Fk
provides content for free during off season it will get an additional advertising revenue of pANααLγsL
from low type consumers with a preference for Fl.
Now we can consider conditions under which ’Always Free’ is the best option for Fk
Step 2i: Consider piFree versus piPaid Off
piFree > piPaid Off ⇐⇒ pANααL(1 + γ)sL > W (1− γ)(αH)(1− sL)
⇐⇒ sL
1− sL >
W (1− γ)
pANα
(
r
1 + γ
)
= ∆
(
r
1 + γ
)
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Step 2ii: Consider piFree versus piPaid All
piFree > piPaid All ⇐⇒ pANsLα(1 + αL(1 + γ)) > W (1− γ)(1 + αH)(1− sL)
⇐⇒ sL
1− sL >
W (1− γ)
pANα
(
1 + αH
1 + αL(1 + γ)
)
= ∆
(
1 + αH
1 + αL(1 + γ)
)
Now
r > 1 + γ ⇒ r
(1 + γ)
=
αH
αL(1 + γ)
> 1
⇒ αH
αL(1 + γ)
>
1 + αH
1 + αL(1 + γ)
⇒ ∆
(
r
1 + γ
)
> ∆
(
1 + αH
1 + αL(1 + γ)
)
When r > 1 + γ, if sL1−sL > ∆
(
r
1+γ
)
(as in 2i) then we must have sL1−sL > ∆
(
1+αH
1+αL(1+γ)
)
(as in 2ii).
Step 2iii: Consider piFree versus piPaid In
piFree > piPaid In ⇐⇒ pANsLα > W (1− γ)1(1− sL)
⇐⇒ sL
1− sL >
W (1− γ)
pANα
= ∆
When r > 1 + γ, if sL1−sL > ∆
(
r
1+γ
)
(as in 2i) then we must have sL1−sL > ∆ (as in 2iii).
From 2i, 2ii and 2iii we esablish that when r > 1 + γ and sL1−sL > ∆
(
r
1+γ
)
, Fk’s best response is to
always provide content for free.
From step 1 and step 2 we prove that if (i) r > 1 + γ, (ii) sL1−sL > ∆
(
r
1+γ
)
and (iii) sL1−sL < r∆
we have an equilibrium where one firm will provide content for free and the other firm will counter-
cyclically adjust its offering.
C Article length
We compare free and paid articles in more detail. For a sample period of seven days (November 9
- 15, 2011), we collect data on the length (measured as the word count) of all free and paid articles
featured in the two most prominent sections of the sports homepages (sections Headlines and Top
22
This manuscript was accepted for publication in 'Management Science'. The version of record can be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2383
This manuscript was accepted for publication in 'Management Science'. The version of record can be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2383
Stories) as well as in the Insider section that lists paid articles. Paid articles are on average longer
but the standard deviation in article length is high, particularly among free articles (word count
free articles: mean=968, SD=965, N=824; word count paid articles: mean=1332, SD=654, N=274)
because of a high number of very short free articles: 10% of free articles have less than 200 words.
We compare all 274 paid articles with the top 274 free articles by word count and find that in this
subset, free articles are on average longer (word count: mean=1832, SD=921, N=274). This finding
suggests that both the paid and the free sections feature many detailed articles. Lastly, we broadly
examine the type of articles in both sections. While the free section includes both news and editorial
content (e.g., comments on a teams performance) the paid section focuses on editorial content and
in-depth reports (e.g., interview with a coach). This finding makes sense because readers could
substitute news articles with content from a competing site, whereas such substitution is more
difficult for editorial content or in-depth reporting.
D ESPN advertising data
We obtain data for all 612 firms that advertised on ESPN.com in June 2011. We chose June as
some sports are in season and some off season: MLB is in season for the full month; NBA and NHL
are in season until June 12 and June 15 respectively; the remaining three sports are off season. For
each advertiser, the data include the total number of impression and the total adverting spend in
US dollars. We find that on average each advertiser has about 2.5 million impressions and spends
about $24,000. However there is strong heterogeneity across advertisers: the standard deviation of
impressions by advertiser is 10.4 million (coefficient of variation of 4.2) and the standard deviation
in spending is about $101,000 (coefficient of variation of 4.3). We obtain an average price per
1000 impressions of $9.25 with a standard deviation of $0.77 (coefficient of variation of 0.08). This
suggests that despite the heterogeneity in impressions and spend across advertisers, the price per
impression is fairly homogeneous. We plot the distribution of price per 1000 impressions across all
612 advertisers in the chart below.
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To further test the variation in advertising rates across season, we created an advertiser account
on ESPN.com (on the web http://espn.adready.com/ads/public). Here an advertiser selects
the timing, channel and targeting of their campaign. Consistent with our model ESPN allows
advertisers to select as ‘channel’ the different sports.10 The targeting of advertisements is based on
geography (for the US an advertiser can select the entire country, a state or a city). Importantly,
consistent with our model assumptions, the advertiser cannot select advertising only on paid versus
free pages within a sport. To understand pricing the table below displays the quoted CPM for
advertising in the United States. We picked two dates to test: August 14th 2015 when all sports
except MLB are off season and December 3rd 2015 when all sports except MLB are in season.
Importantly we find that though the quoted CPMs from ESPN vary by sport they do not vary
across season.
10The options for channels are: Run of Site, Boxing, College Basketball, College Football, Fantasy Games, MLB,
MMA, NASCAR, NBA, NFL, NHL, Racing, Cricinfo, Deportes Los Angles, Deportes Mobile ROS, Deportes ROS,
FC, Footytips, Jayski ROS
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E Analytical model with empirical means
We use estimates from our data to show that for ESPN the conditions laid out in Proposition 1
in Section 2.2 hold. Our approach is to show for which range of parameter values counter-cyclical
pricing would be optimal and then demonstrate that the setting we study falls within this parameter
range. We estimate the ratio of off-season to in-season valuations for high type consumers, αHO , as
the ratio of visitors to the paid section during off season relative to when a sport is in season
(αHO ≡ Paid VisitorsOff SeasonPaid VisitorsIn Season = 0.98). We estimate the corresponding ratio for low type consumers,
αLO, as the scaled number of Google searches for ‘sport + ESPN’ during that sport’s off season
relative to the scaled number of Google searches for ‘sport + ESPN’ when the sport is in season
(αLO ≡ GoogleOff SeasonGoogleIn Season = 0.25). Therefore, r ≡
αHO
αLO
= 3.99. We estimate the share of low type
consumers, sL, as the share of unique visitors during off season that do not visit the paid section,
sL = 0.98.
Using these estimates, we rewrite Proposition 1 as 0.08 > pAαNW α > 0.02. We estimate
pA
W =
1.14
1000
11 and αN represent the number of visits of low type consumers during a sport’s season that
is over six months. As we do not observe the average number of monthly visits per consumer in
the free section, we use the data to compute upper and lower bounds for the number of monthly
visits of low type consumers during a sport’s season and find these to be 11.69, respectively 2.92
11Based on Figure 2, Panels A and B, W is the average subscription price of $41.26 from Section 3.3 divided by
αHO which has a value of 0.98. The total advertising revenue per visit, $pA, is defined as (page views per visit) x
(advertising revenue per page view). The average number of page views per visit in the free section is 5.15 (see Panel
A, Figure 3). The average advertising revenue per 1000 page views is $9.11 (see Section 3.3).
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visits. From Comscore we obtain additional data that documents that on average paid subscribers
(i.e. high type consumers) make 7.22 daily unique visits in a month so it seems plausible that the
visit frequency of low type consumers falls indeed within these bounds.
In sum, the analysis supports that the conditions that our simple model predicts must hold for
counter-cyclical offering to be optimal, indeed hold for the specific empirical setting of a firm that
counter-cyclically adjusts content.
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A: Normalized Google searches for news, sports, entertainment and finance related terms 
 
B: Unique daily visitors (000s) to MLB pages of leading sports websites in 20111 
 
                                                          
1
 The grey area represents times when Major League Baseball is in season.  
Figure 1: Demand for news
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A: Model setup: Heterogeneity in valuations across types and seasons 
 
 
B: Firm options: Implication of firm policy on profit 
 
 
C: Illustration of main result (Proposition 1): Shows how firm profits by pricing policies vary 
with the share of low type consumers1. 
 
                                                          
1
 The profit from the policy “Paid In Season“ is always less than from the policy “Always Paid” (see proof of Proposition 1, step 3 in 
the Appendix) 
All paid
Paid Off Season
All Free
Always Paid Paid Off Season Always Free
Share of Low Type Consumers (sL)
P
ro
fi
ts
Figure 2: Analytical model setup and results
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A: Descriptive statistics  
 
B:  Percentage of explained variance by demand shifters1 
 
                                                          
1
 Sports refers to sports fixed effects. Season is an indicator for a sport being in season. Other Demand Controls include indicator 
variables for Gameday, Draft, Strike, Final Game, Weekend, and corresponding variables for Yahoo, CNNSI, CBS and Google Scaled. 
Percentage explained variance based on a R
2
 from a linear regression. 
 Metric Mean Std. Dev. Median
Number of articles 33.78 17.82 30.00
Share of paid articles 30% 12% 30%
Unique visitors (000s) 648.71 504.73 490.50
Page views per visitor 5.15 2.38 4.54
Time spent per pageview 0.94 0.27 0.91
Unique paid visitor (000s) 28.31 42.82 19.27
Paid page views per paid visitor 2.06 1.71 1.62
Time spent per paid pageview 0.84 0.51 0.77
Unique visitors (000s) 879.75 989.63 562.75
Page views per visitor 5.54 3.27 4.59
Time spent per pageview 1.11 0.40 1.07
Unique visitors (000s) 78.26 70.42 58.57
Page views per visitor 3.52 5.56 2.83
Time spent per pageview 0.88 0.36 0.84
Unique visitors (000s) 81.77 104.23 52.11
Page views per visitor 4.39 3.75 3.38
Time spent per pageview 0.96 0.43 0.92
Google Scaled (10s) 1.29 1.25 0.77
CBS
ESPN 
articles
ESPN free 
section
ESPN paid 
section
Yahoo
CNNSI
Figure 3: Descriptive statistics
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A: Summary statistics across seasons 
 
 
B: Percentage change in key variables from a sport being in season to off season 
 
In Season                  
(n = 1,100)
Off Season               
(n = 932)
Difference in 
Means 
 Metric Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean p-value
Number of articles 40.74 20.12 25.57 9.50 -15.18 0.00*
Share of paid articles 25% 11% 35% 11% 10% 0.00*
Unique visitors (000s) 891.18 524.09 362.54 282.98 -528.64 0.00*
Page views per visitor 6.08 2.52 4.07 1.63 -2.01 0.00*
Time spent per pageview 0.99 0.28 0.89 0.25 -0.10 0.00*
Unique paid visitor (000s) 26.83 26.60 30.06 56.20 3.24 0.11
Paid page views per paid visitor 1.86 1.18 2.31 2.15 0.45 0.00*
Time spent per paid pageview 0.85 0.55 0.83 0.45 -0.02 0.35
Unique visitors (000s) 1172.31 1069.03 534.45 752.98 -637.86 0.00*
Page views per visitor 6.40 3.43 4.54 2.76 -1.86 0.00*
Time spent per pageview 1.09 0.28 1.13 0.50 0.04 0.05*
Unique visitors (000s) 99.84 72.46 52.80 58.49 -47.04 0.00*
Page views per visitor 4.04 7.01 2.91 2.94 -1.13 0.00*
Time spent per pageview 0.91 0.34 0.85 0.38 -0.05 0.00*
Unique visitors (000s) 115.32 126.13 42.18 44.95 -73.14 0.00*
Page views per visitor 5.79 4.22 2.74 2.15 -3.05 0.00*
Time spent per pageview 1.06 0.40 0.84 0.44 -0.22 0.00*
Google Scaled (10s) 1.97 1.25 0.48 0.62 -1.49 0.00*
CBS
ESPN 
articles
ESPN free 
section
ESPN paid 
section
Yahoo
CNNSI
Figure 4: Descriptive statistics across seasons (* refers to significance at 95% confidence level)
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A: Density plots by sport and season: Each row represents one of our six sports. We plot the density of 
unique ESPN visitors (left column) and percent paid articles (right column). The black line refers to when the 
sport is in season and the grey dotted line refers to when a sport is off season. The difference in means is the 
mean(in Season) – mean(off season). * represents significant difference of means at a 95% confidence level. 
  
 
Density of Percent Paid Articles Density of log(ESPN unique visitors) 
Figure 5: Evidence for counter-cyclical offering
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A: Regression results to show counter-cyclical offering 
 
 
B: Regression results to show consistency with simple model1 
 
Numbers represent parameter estimates with standard errors in parenthesis. * represents 
significance at a 95% confidence level.  
                                                          
1
 Competing website controls for Columns (1), (3) and (4) are unique visitors to Yahoo, CNNSI, and CBS and for Column (2) page 
views per visitor at Yahoo, CNNSI, and CBS. Demand controls are Google Scaled, Gameday, Draft, Strike, Special and Weekend 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Parameters
log(Unique ESPN 
Visitors)
log(Yahoo unique 
visitors)
log(Unique ESPN 
Paid Visitors)
Logit(Percentage of 
Paid Articles)
In Season  0.36 (0.05)*  0.39 (0.10)*  -0.24 (0.13)  -0.29 (0.11)*
Game day  0.07 (0.04)  0.05 (0.07)  0.00 (0.13)  -0.20 (0.14)
log(Yahoo unique visitors)  0.14 (0.01)*  0.12 (0.04)*  -0.10 (0.02)*
log(SI unique visitors)  0.14 (0.01)*  0.22 (0.04)*  0.09 (0.04)*  0.01 (0.03)
log(CBS unique visitors)  0.12 (0.02)*  0.22 (0.04)*  0.02 (0.06)  0.03 (0.03)
Google Scaled  0.16 (0.02)*  0.02 (0.00)*  0.01 (0.00)*  -0.00 (0.00)
Draft  -0.06 (0.12)  0.02 (0.23)  1.12 (0.33)*  0.08 (0.17)
Strike  0.04 (0.06)  0.32 (0.15)*  -0.78 (0.26)*  0.22 (0.18)
Special  -0.23 (0.15)  0.16 (0.11)  0.02 (0.29)  -0.37 (0.25)
Weekend  -0.18 (0.02)*  -0.25 (0.04)*  -0.27 (0.04)*  -0.08 (0.02)*
Fixed effect Sports
Standard Errors Clustered by Sports-Month
R2 0.88 0.67 0.40 0.43
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Parameters
Logit(Share of 
paid visitors)
Page views per 
visitor
log(Unique ESPN 
Visitors)
log(Unique ESPN 
Visitors)
In Season  -0.65 (0.14)* 0.08 (0.22) 0.34 (0.05)* 0.35 (0.05)*
Percent of Paid 
Articles
 -0.40 (0.14)* -0.15 (0.23)
xIn Season  -0.42 (0.24)
Controls Competing Websites, Demand Controls and Sports Fixed Effects
Standard Errors Clustered by Sport-Month
R2 0.28 0.37 0.88 0.88
Figure 6: Further evidence for counter-cyclical offering
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